

Verified Key-Value Stores satisfying Snapshot Isolation

Arnaud Daby-Seesaram
arnaud.daby-seesaram@cs.au.dk
Aarhus University
Aarhus, Denmark

Lars Birkedal
birkedal@cs.au.dk
Aarhus University
Aarhus, Denmark

Léon Ducruet
leon.ducruet@cs.au.dk
Aarhus University
Aarhus, Denmark

Amin Timany
timany@cs.au.dk
Aarhus University
Aarhus, Denmark

Isolation Levels constrain the behaviour of concurrent transactions in a database. Among them, Snapshot Isolation is particularly important and widely used since it provides strong guarantees while allowing more efficient implementations than Serialisability. However, isolation bugs are common [1]. Also, clients making incorrect assumptions about the isolation guarantees can lead to security vulnerabilities [12]. Testing techniques can detect bugs in both databases [8, 9, 13] and their clients [2], but cannot rule out bugs altogether.

In this work we use separation logic, a flavour of Hoare logic, to prove correctness of both an implementation of Snapshot Isolation, called SliS, and its clients. To this end, we use the Iris [7] separation logic framework and its Rocq mechanisation which we have used to mechanise all our results. Separation logic, and Iris in particular has already been proven useful for verifying databases and their clients [3, 5, 10]. Recent work by Mathiasen et al. [10] has shown how to specify several database isolation levels in separation logic, including Snapshot Isolation. However, their implementation is inefficient; it uses a global lock to protect the whole database. In contrast, SliS is an efficient in-memory key-value store library satisfying Snapshot Isolation. It is implemented based on a lock-free variant of Reed’s multi-version concurrency control algorithm [11], and a verified garbage collector that periodically prunes stale versions.

Specs. We give specs for the following database operations: `init_kvs`, `start`, `read`, `scan`, `write`, `delete`, `abort`, and `commit`. Our specifications are based on so-called logically atomic triples which in addition to ordinary pre- and post-conditions, also specify the state of the database immediately before and after the linearisation point [6] of the operation. For instance, for the `commit` operation, the spec, given in Figure 1, specifies that:

Precondition: The transaction being committed is a valid transaction of the database db with snapshot S , written $\text{IsTransaction}(tr, db, S)$.

Immediately before the lin. point: The transaction is in state (C, U) , written $\text{TransState}(tr, C, U)$, where C maps all keys accessed by tr to their values, and U is the set of keys

$$\begin{aligned} & \{ \text{IsTransaction}(tr, db, S) \} \\ & \left\langle \exists M, C, U. \text{IsKvs}(db, M) * \text{TransState}(tr, C, U) * \bigstar_{k \in U} k \mapsto^{db} M(k) \right\rangle \\ & \text{commit } tr \\ & \left\langle \begin{array}{l} b. b = \text{CanCommit}(M, S, U) * \\ \text{if } b \text{ then } \text{IsKvs}(db, \text{update}(M, C, U)) * \bigstar_{(k,v) \in C \wedge k \in U} k \mapsto^{db} v :: M(k) \\ \text{else } \text{IsKvs}(db, M) * \bigstar_{k \in U} k \mapsto^{db} M(k) \end{array} \right\rangle \\ & \{ \text{True} \} \end{aligned}$$

Figure 1. Specification of `commit`

whose value is overwritten or inserted during tr . The database is in state M ($\text{IsKvs}(db, M)$). And, we require the exclusive ownership of all keys that have been *overwritten or inserted*, written $k \mapsto^{db} M(k)$.¹ (Here, $*$ is the separating conjunction of separation logic.)

Immediately after the lin. point: The result of the operation is the boolean $b = \text{CanCommit}(M, S, U)$ where the `CanCommit` function (a pure Rocq function) returns true if and only if the overwritten keys in U have the same version history in snapshot S as they do in the current state M , *i.e.*, if there was no write-write conflicts.

Postcondition: needs not carry any further information than the condition immediately after the linearisation point.

A simple client. In our specs $\text{CanCommit}(M, S, U)$ ensures that `commit` does not fail more transactions than strictly necessary. This allows to *prove* the success of `commit` operations in client code. In particular, we can leverage separation logic’s reasoning principles about fractional ownership to prove that concurrent transactions can succeed, as illustrated in Figure 2. Since T2 keeps half of the permission to overwrite key x (represented by $x \mapsto_{1/2}^{db} [0]$), it can *prove* that no concurrent transaction can overwrite key x and thus, that it can successfully commit.

Evaluation. We ran the Yahoo! Cloud Serving Benchmarks (YCSB) [4] on SliS, which we have implemented in OCaml. SliS provided throughput in the neighbourhood of around 1 million transactions per second for workloads A–C (using 18 threads on a virtual machine with 20 cores).

¹Database assertions keep track of the complete value history of keys. This simplifies the definition of `CanCommit`.




Figure 2. Provably Successful Transactions in Client-Code

Future work. Our proofs only ensure safety and functional correctness of SlrIS and its (verified) clients, *i.e.*, that they do not crash, and that they produce correct result when they terminate. However, we have not proven any liveness properties, *e.g.*, that there are no deadlocks or live-locks. We leave this as future work.

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